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A B S T R AC T
When the United States puts a cap on carbon
emissions as part of the effort to address the
problem of global climate change, this will increase the prices of fossil fuels, significantly
impacting not only consumers but also local,
state, and federal governments. Consumers can
be “made whole,” in the sense that whatever
amount the public pays in higher fuel prices is
recycled to the public, by means of a cap-anddividend policy: individual households will come
out ahead or behind in monetary terms depending on whether they consume above-average or
below-average amounts of carbon. In this paper, we consider policy options for “keeping the
government whole,” too; that is, policies to en-

sure that additional revenues to government
compensate adequately for the additional costs
to government as a result of the carbon cap. We
compare the distributional impacts of two policy
alternatives: (i) setting aside a portion of the
revenue from carbon permit auctions for government, and distributing the remainder of the
revenue to the public in the form of tax-free
dividends; or (ii) distributing all of the carbon
revenue to households as taxable dividends.
The policy of recycling 100% of carbon revenue
to the public as taxable dividends has the
strongest progressive impact, yielding the biggest net monetary benefits for the largest majority of the people.s
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I N T R O D UC T I ON
As the United States moves to craft serious policies to tackle the problem of global warming,
discussion is focusing on the impacts of a cap on
total emissions of carbon dioxide from burning
fossil fuels. Carbon permits will be issued up to
the cap, the number of permits declining over
time as the cap is gradually tightened. From an
administrative standpoint, the most efficient way
to accomplish this is to issue the permits “upstream” to the few hundred firms that bring fossil
fuels into the nation’s economy at roughly 2,000
locations – oil terminals, gas pipelines, coal
mines – rather than issuing downstream permits
to far larger numbers of end-users.
A carbon permit system will raise the prices of
fossil fuels throughout the economy, as the cap
restricts their supply much as OPEC raises prices
by cutting production. The effects will be felt by
every household, but the price increases will hit
low-income and middle-income families harder
than more affluent households because they
spend a higher fraction of their incomes on fuels.
To protect the real incomes of American families,
and to protect the carbon cap from the political
backlash that otherwise is likely to result from
substantially higher prices for gasoline, heating
oil and electricity, one policy option that is gaining
increasing attention is a “cap-and-dividend” system in which revenues from the sale of permits
are recycled to the public as equal per capita
dividends. In an earlier paper, we analyzed the
distributional impacts of such a policy and
showed that the majority of American households
would be net winners in monetary terms – receiving more in dividends than they pay in higher fuel
costs – with the biggest benefits accruing to lowincome families (Boyce and Riddle 2007).1
The price impacts of a carbon cap will be felt not
only by consumers, but also by governments at
the local, state, and federal levels. The prices of
heating oil and coal-fired electricity will rise for
schools and other public buildings, just as it will
1 For further discussion of cap-and-dividend policies, see
Barnes (2008), DeCanio (2008), and capanddividend.org.

rise for homeowners. The prices of gasoline and
diesel will rise for the Pentagon and other government agencies, just as it will for private citizens. To “keep the government whole” – to
compensate for these higher costs and to maintain real government spending at current levels –
revenues will need to grow by a corresponding
amount.

The price impacts of a carbon cap will
be felt not only by consumers, but also
by governments.
In this paper, we analyze two policy options for
addressing the impacts of a cap-and-dividend
program on government:
•

Distribute 100% of revenue to individuals as
taxable dividends: In our calculations we assume that dividends are subject to federal
and state income taxes at the same rate as
ordinary income, and that dividends are
spent by households and hence subject to
state sales tax. We find that 24.2% of dividends (on average) would be returned to the
federal and state governments under this
option, an amount sufficient to keep the
government whole in that it compensates for
the impact of higher fossil fuel prices on government purchasing power.

•

Revenue set aside for government, coupled
with tax-free dividends to individuals: An alternative policy option is to earmark a fraction of the carbon revenue (that is, the
revenue from sale of permits) for governments, rather than recycling 100% of this
revenue to the public. In this option, dividends to individuals would be treated as taxfree. To facilitate comparison of the two options, we assume that the set-aside is calibrated to keep the government share of
total carbon revenue the same as under the
first option.

We examine the distributional impacts of both
policy options by dividing the U.S. population into
ten deciles, ranked from poorest to richest on the
basis of per capita expenditure. As in Boyce and

KEEPING THE GOVERNMENT WHOLE / BOYCE & RIDDLE / PAGE 2

Riddle (2007), our calculations are based on a
permit price of $200 per ton of carbon, a price
that we estimate would result from an initial cap
that cuts U.S. carbon emissions by approximately
7%. We estimate that this cap and price would
yield annual carbon revenues of roughly $300
billion/year.
What will happen as the carbon cap tightens in
successive years, moving towards the much
greater emissions reductions now endorsed by
an increasing number of policy makers?2 As the
quantity of permits (and emissions) falls, their
price will rise. The percentage increase in prices
being larger than the percentage decrease in
quantity of permits (because demand for fossil
fuels is price-inelastic), total revenue will rise, too.
This will increase the magnitude of the distributional effects reported below, but not their pattern: with a doubling of total carbon revenues, for
example, the net benefits for low-income and
middle-income households double, as do the net
costs for high-income households.
“ KE E P I N G THE G OVE R NM E NT WH O LE ”
What share of revenue from the sale of carbon
permits would be required to keep government
whole, that is, to offset the effects of the cap-andpermit policy on the balance between government expenditures and government revenues,
with “government” here taken to encompass
federal, state and local governments?

expenditure.3 Government expenditure accounted for 14.5% of the nation’s “carbon footprint” in the year 2002.4 This is close to the
estimate of Dinan and Rogers (2002, p. 205),
who put the government share of U.S. carbon
emissions in 1998 at 13%.
State and local government accounted for 10.8%
of total U.S. carbon emissions, and federal government for 3.6%. These percentages are smaller
than their shares in expenditure: the carbon intensity of public expenditure is less than that of
private consumption, reflecting the higher proportion of services (e.g., salaries) in the government consumption basket.5
In addition to the impact of increased costs due
to higher fossil fuel prices, the introduction of
carbon permits could have indirect impacts on
the balance between government expenditure
and revenue. These include increases in government transfer payments (e.g., for Social Security benefits and federal pensions) that are
indexed to prices, and reduced personal income
tax collections as a result of the indexing of exemptions and tax brackets. Dinan and Rogers
(2002, p. 211) estimate that each of these would
have impacts roughly equivalent to a further 7%
of carbon revenue. If so, adding these to the direct effects of higher fuel prices on government
purchasing power would mean that 28% of total
carbon revenues will be needed to keep the government whole.6

The most evident effect of a cap-and-dividend
policy (or for that matter, of any policy that includes a cap on carbon emissions) on government is to raise the cost of government’s own
consumption of fossil fuels and everything that
uses these fuels in its production and distribution. Table 1 presents estimates of government
carbon consumption, based on government expenditure patterns and input-output data on the
fossil fuel content of the various categories of

3 Breakdowns of government expenditures by industrial
sector are taken from 2002 benchmark input-output accounts. Carbon emissions from coal, oil and natural gas are
based on Energy Information Administration data. Carbon
emissions associated with each industrial sector are calculated by following the use of coal, oil, and natural gas
through the economy using input-output accounts. For details on sources, see notes to Table 1.

President-elect Barack Obama, for example, has endorsed
the goal of cutting U.S. emissions 80% from the 1990 level
by the year 2050. In California, the same goal was established on June 1, 2005, by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Executive Order S-3-05 (for this and other state-level
policy targets, see Pew Center on Global Climate Change,
2008).

5 Government expenditure here refers to spending on goods
and services, and excludes transfer payments (such as
Social Security) which constitute part of household income.

2

4 This includes emissions from government consumption,
plus a fraction of emissions attributable to investment expenditure (with the fraction equal to the share of government consumption in economy-wide non-investment
expenditure).

Dinan and Rogers (2002) also add small impacts imputed
to “deadweight losses” and the tax impact of reduced GDP
growth, arriving at total net effects on government equivalent to 29.6% of carbon revenue. Both adjustments are
6
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TAB LE 1: GOVE RNMENT A ND PRIVATE SHA RES OF U.S. C ARB ON EMISSI ONS (2002)
Sector
Government: Total
Federal government

Share of expenditure (%)
19.0

Carbon intensity
(kgCO2/$)

Share of carbon
emissions (%)

0.43

14.5

6.5

0.31

3.6

Defense

4.2

0.31

2.3

Other

2.3

0.32

1.3
10.8

State & local government

12.5

0.49

Education

5.4

0.48

4.6

Other

7.1

0.50

6.2

72.4

0.57

73.5

64.6

0.57

65.7

7.7

0.57

7.8

8.8

0.78

12.0

Private:
Private: Total
Household consumption
Non-profit institutions
Exports

Notes: Authors’ calculations. Carbon intensity computed following the input-output methodology of Metcalf (1999). Emissions
from investment expenditure are allocated across sectors based on expenditure shares.
Sources:
US Bureau of Economic Analysis, "2002 Standard Make and Use Tables at the Summary Level", available at
http://www.bea.gov/industry/io_benchmark.htm.
Non-profit share of household consumption taken from data cited in Garner et al. (2006).
Additional data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA):
Carbon emissions: “International Energy Annual 2005” (available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea/carbon.html).
Crude oil consumption: “Petroleum Navigator, US Crude Oil Supply and Deposition” (available at
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_sum_crdsnd_adc_mbbl_a.htm).
Crude oil use by refineries: “Petroleum Navigator; Refining & Processing; Weekly Inputs, Utilization & Production” (available at
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pnp_wiup_dcu_nus_w.htm).

These indirect impacts could be offset, however,
by the recycling of carbon revenue to the public
under a cap-and-dividend policy. Payment of
equal per capita dividends acts as a substitute
for indexing transfer payments in response to
policy-induced fuel price increases, as both are
intended to insulate households from the impact
of the price increases on their real incomes. And
if the dividends are treated as taxable income,
this will augment tax revenues.
A comprehensive strategy to promote energy
efficiency and the transition to clean energy
sources would likely include public investments,
in addition to the cap on carbon emissions. Addopen to question: the “welfare losses” ignore the welfare
gains which are the rationale for a carbon policy in the first
place; and there is no consensus as to the magnitude or
even the sign of the effects of a carbon policy on GDP
growth.

ing funding “to provide for increased government
expenditure on research and development and
other measures to address climate change,”
Burtraw et al. (2008, p. 26) take 35% as the
share of carbon revenue to be allocated to the
government budget. In a separate paper (Boyce
and Riddle 2008) we discuss policy options for
funding public investment in support of the energy transition. In this paper we focus on the narrower question of how to maintain government
purchasing power at current levels.
A L L O C AT I NG C A R B ON RE VE N UE
A M O N G FE DE R A L, S T ATE , A N D L O CA L
G O VE R N ME NT S
Whatever fraction of total carbon revenues is
recycled to government, a key issue will be how
to allocate these revenues among federal, state,
and local governments. This is particularly important in the case of local governments, which typi-
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cally do not levy income taxes or sales taxes and
hence lack any automatic mechanisms to obtain
revenues under a cap-and-dividend policy.
There are two stages to this problem. The first is
how to allocate carbon revenues across the three
levels of government: federal, state, and local.
The second is how to allocate revenues among
the 50 states, and within states among local
governments.

A key issue is how to allocate carbon
revenues among federal,
federal, state, and
local governments.
With regard to the first stage, one possible allocation rule is to apportion the government share of
carbon revenue across the three levels of government in proportion to their respective total
expenditures on goods and services. Based on
the expenditure shares reported in Table 1, this
would translate into roughly 34% of the government carbon-revenue pool being allocated to the
federal government, and the remaining 66% to
state and local governments. This allocation rule
does not take into account differences in the
carbon intensity of expenditure across the three
levels of government. But as shown in the table,
state and local government expenditures tend to
be more carbon-intensive than federal expenditures. An alternative rule is to apportion carbon
revenue across the three levels of government in
proportion to their carbon emissions, that is, in
proportion to the extent to which the carbon cap
will raise their operating costs. Under this allocation rule, the federal share of government carbon
revenue would be 24% and the state and local
share would be 76%.
With regard to the second-stage problem – allocation across the 50 states and across local governments – the revenue-sharing formula should
provide incentives for governments themselves
to improve their energy efficiency and invest in
clean energy. In the same way that the cap-anddividend policy creates incentives for consumers
and private-sector firms to reduce their use of
fossil fuels, state and local governments should

be given incentives to do the same. This implies
that inter-state and inter-locality revenue allocation should not simply be based on carbon use.
One possible rule is to allocate revenue on the
basis of population – that is, on an equal per
capita basis – a formula consistent with the capand-dividend logic of distributing dividends to
households on an equal per capita basis.
O P T I ON 1 : DI S T RI BU T E 1 0 0 % O F
R E V E N UE T O I N D IV ID UA L S A S T AX A B LE
D I V ID E N D S
One option is to recycle all of the carbon revenue
to households as individual dividends. With a
carbon permit price of $200/ton carbon, the
dividends would amount to $1161/person/year.
Assuming these are treated as ordinary income,
we estimate that 24.2% of dividend payments
would return to government in the form of federal
and state income taxes and state sales taxes.7
Federal income taxes account for 18.1% of this
amount; state income and sales taxes account
for the remainder.8
Tax rates vary by income class, of course, so not
all households will return 24.2% of their dividends to government. We estimate that the
share of dividends claimed by taxes would range
from 10.2% in the poorest decile to 39.7% in the
top decile.

Federal income tax rates were calculated using data from
the Internal Revenue Service (2006) that show an average
statutory marginal tax rate of 13%. Following calculations by
the Congressional Budget Office (2005), we incorporate
effects of tax-code provisions that increase the average
marginal rate to 14%, and the effect of the 2010 expiry of
temporary tax cuts which further increases the average
marginal rate to 16.7%. Adjusting for the fact that carbon
dividend payments would be unearned income (analogous
to rental income), and hence not subject to the provisions of
the Earned Income Tax Credit or the refundable portion of
the Child Tax Credit, the average marginal rate on dividends
rises to 18.1%. Our estimate for state income and sales
taxes is based on all-state averages reported by Citizens for
Tax Justice (1996).

7

8 The income and sales tax revenues are based solely on the
dividends received and spent by households. We do not
include “multiplier effects” on income tax revenues from
firms.
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TAB LE 2: DIS TRIBU TI O NA L IM PAC T O F CA P-A ND- DIVI DE ND PO LI CY
WITH 100% OF REVE NUE PAID TO I NDIVIDUALS AS TAXAB LE DIVIDE NDS
Decile (based
on per capita
expenditure)

Expenditure
per capita

Charge
(costs from
higher
fossil fuel
prices) per
capita

Dividend
per capita

Taxes (federal
+ state) on
dividends (%)

Taxes (federal
+ state) on
dividends ($)

Net
impact
($)

Net impact
(as % of
expenditure)

1

1927

269

1161

10.2%

119

773

40.1%

2

3521

405

1161

10.8%

125

631

17.9%

3

4736

493

1161

17.6%

205

464

9.8%

4

5991

589

1161

21.2%

246

326

5.4%

5

7380

653

1161

25.1%

291

217

2.9%

6

8847

732

1161

26.4%

306

123

1.4%

7

10711

823

1161

26.6%

309

30

0.3%

8

13228

938

1161

28.2%

328

-104

-0.8%

9

17178

1139

1161

36.5%

424

-402

-2.3%

10

29943

1639

1161

39.7%

460

-938

-3.1%

Average

10346

768

1161

24.2%

281

112

1.1%

The distributional impact of this policy option is
reported in Table 2. Because a cap-and-dividend
policy “charges” households (via higher prices for
fossil fuels) in proportion to their carbon consumption, higher-expenditure households generally
pay
more
than
lower-expenditure
households. Dividends are paid equally to all. In
other words, people pay based on their use of the
Earth’s carbon-absorptive capacities, and receive
dividends based on the principle that the resulting revenue belongs equally to all. Richer households pay more than they receive, while poorer
households receive more than they pay.

At the same time, this policy option keeps the
government whole in the sense that the government share of carbon revenue that is recouped
via taxes on dividends (24.2%) exceeds the government share of carbon emissions (14.5%). Indeed, it does so by a margin that is large enough
to compensate for at least some of the effects of
indexation of transfer payments and tax brackets
on government revenue (if these were not addressed via other policies), and/or to fund government spending that complements the capand-dividend policy by investing in energy efficiency and renewable energy sources.

The bottom seven deciles come out ahead, in the
sense that what they receive in dividends exceeds what they pay as a result of higher fuel
prices. There are two reasons why the number of
“winners” – here defined in purely monetary
terms, without taking into account the benefits
from curbing global warming – outnumber the
“losers” by roughly a 2:1 margin. First, expenditure is skewed to the top of the income distribution (put differently, average expenditure is
greater than median expenditure). Second, the
after-tax share of total carbon revenues retained
by households (75.8%) is greater than the
household share of carbon emissions and hence
carbon charges (65.7%, as reported in Table 1).

As can be seen in Table 1, the reason that both
government and households can come out
ahead is that there are two additional sources of
carbon revenue: non-profit institutions and buyers of U.S. exports, who like households and government pay higher prices for fossil fuels (and for
everything that is produced and distributed by
using them) but receive no compensation.9

9 The calculations reported here assume that imports are
subject to “carbon tariffs” equivalent to the carbon permit
charges that are embodied in the prices of domestically
produced goods and services. If no carbon tariffs are levied
on imported goods (or, for administrative simplicity, they are
levied only on the high-carbon subset of imported goods),
this will correspondingly decrease both the charge to con-
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TAB LE 3: DIS TRIBU TI O NA L IM PACT O F CA P-A ND- DIVI DE ND PO LI CY
WITH REVENUE SET ASIDE FOR GOVERNMENT
Decile (based
on per capita
expenditure)

Expenditure
per capita

Charge
(costs from
higher fossil
fuel prices)
per capita

Dividend
per capita

Taxes (federal
+ state) on
dividends (%)

Taxes (federal
+ state) on
dividends ($)

Net impact
($)

Net impact
(as % of
expenditure)

1

1927

254

919

4.4%

40

624

32.4%

2

3521

390

919

4.4%

40

488

13.9%

3

4736

486

919

4.4%

40

393

8.3%

4

5991

586

919

4.4%

40

293

4.9%

5

7380

654

919

4.4%

40

225

3.0%

6

8847

733

919

4.4%

40

145

1.6%

7

10711

825

919

4.4%

40

54

0.5%

8

13228

941

919

4.4%

40

-62

-0.5%

9

17178

1149

919

4.4%

40

-270

-1.6%

10

29943

1649

919

4.4%

40

-770

-2.6%

Average

10346

767

919

4.4%

40

112

1.1%

In other words, the additional government revenue resulting from 100% recycling of carbon
revenues as taxable dividends to individuals
would be sufficient to keep the government
whole. We again note, however, that in this as
any other policy option, a mechanism for intergovernmental allocation will be needed to allo-

The additional government revenue
resulting from 100% recycling of carbon
revenues as taxable dividends to
indi
individuals would be sufficient to keep
the government whole.
cate the government share of carbon revenues
equitably among local, state, and federal governments.
O P T I ON
2:
RE VE N UE
SE T
A SI DE
F O R G O VE RN M E N T , A N D TA X - F RE E
D I V ID E N D S T O IN D IV I D U A L S
A second option is to set aside carbon revenue
for government to offset the policy’s impact on
government expenditure, returning the remainder
to the public as tax-free dividends. To facilitate
comparison of the two options, we assume in our
calculations that government again receives
sumers and amount that households receive as dividends,
leaving average net benefits unchanged.

24.2% of the total carbon revenue (primarily via
the set aside, with a small amount also coming
from sales taxes as households spend their dividends) and the remaining 75.8% goes to households.10 The distributional impact of this policy is
shown in Table 3.
Under this option, the bottom seven deciles again
come out ahead in purely monetary terms. The
net gains for the lower deciles are somewhat
lower, however, as are the net costs for the upper
deciles, so the distributional incidence is somewhat less progressive. The difference arises from
how the government share is financed. In the
previous option, the fraction of dividends returned to government via taxes varies across the
deciles, with a higher fraction for more affluent
households. In the set-aside scenario, each person’s dividend is cut by the same amount – a
policy that is, in effect, equivalent to a head tax.
C O N C L U SI O N S
Any policy that puts a cap on carbon emissions
will increase the prices of fossil fuels, with significant impacts on local, state, and federal governments as well as on consumers. This is true
10 The calculations presented here differ from those in our
earlier paper (Boyce and Riddle 2007), mainly because
there only 67% of total carbon revenue was recycled to
individuals.
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regardless of whether the permits (that is, the
allocation of rights to emit under the cap) are
given away or auctioned to polluters, and regardless of whether auction revenues are retained by
the government, recycled to the public, or any
mix of the two. Higher prices are the corollary of
scarcity, and scarcity (compared to the situation
with no carbon cap) is precisely what the policy is
intended to create.
Households can be made whole, in the sense
that what the public at large pays in higher fuel
prices is recycled back to the public, by a capand-dividend policy: individuals win or lose in
monetary terms from the policy depending on
whether they consume above-average or belowaverage amounts of carbon. To keep the government whole, as well, similar policies are
needed to ensure that enough of the carbon
revenues flow to governments to compensate for
the additional costs they incur as a result of the
carbon cap and consequent fuel price increases.
In this paper, we compared the distributional
impacts of two alternative policies: (i) distributing
all of the carbon revenue to households as taxable dividends, and (ii) setting aside part the carbon revenue for government, while distributing
the remainder of the revenue to the public as taxfree dividends. Both policies protect the real incomes of the majority of American households
and have a progressive impact on the distribution
of income. The policy of recycling 100% of carbon
revenue to the public as taxable dividends has a
stronger progressive impact.
Apart from recycling a sufficient total quantity of
carbon revenues to government, a further issue
is how to allocate these monies amongst federal,
state, and local governments, by means of a formula that is fair and provides incentives for governments to curb their own carbon emissions.
We have suggested a two-step allocation rule for
this purpose: first, to apportion the revenue
amongst the three levels of government – federal, state, and local – according to their respective shares in GDP; and second, within the state
and local-government shares, to allocate revenue
on the basis of population.
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